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The concept of the motivating operation (MO) has been subject to 3 criticisms: 
(a) the terms and concepts employed do not always overlap with traditional 
behavior-analytic verbal practices; (b) the dual nature of the MO is unclear; 
and (c) there is a lack of adequate contact with empirical data. We offer a more 
parsimonious approach to motivation, extending Skinner’s (1938, 1953) early 
work on this topic, and introduce two new key terms: consequence-valuing  
operation (CVO) and consequence-valuing process (CVP). Our account focuses 
on the value of the reinforcer in terms of the level of responding that occurs 
relative to some previously measured baseline. We suggest that the concepts of 
the CVO and CVP will facilitate the identification, analysis, and manipulation 
of motivational factors in the treatment of behavior disorders. 
Key words: motivation, establishing operation, motivating operation, 
consequence-valuing operation, consequence-valuing process
In the words of Catania (1992), “When we study motivation or drive 
we’re concerned with what makes consequences more or less effective 
[emphasis added] as reinforcers or as punishers” (p. 77). Keller and 
Schoenfeld (1950) introduced the term establishing operation (EO; p. 269) 
to distinguish motivational effects from reinforcement effects. Skinner 
(1953) distinguished between satiation and deprivation and other types 
of environmental variables that influence the effectiveness of reinforcers. 
For example, for a water-deprived person “a large group of operants are 
strengthened” (p. 143), such as going to the kitchen, operating a drinking 
fountain, and so on. Leigland (1984), however, noted that the treatment of 
motivational variables in behavior analysis has suffered from the lack of a 
clear functional definition. 
Michael (1982, 1988, 1993a, 1993b, 2000) and his colleagues (Laraway, 
Snycerski, Michael, & Poling, 2001/2002, 2003) have sought to more clearly 
describe motivational variables by developing and extending Skinner’s 
treatment of motivation, most recently by introducing the term motivating 
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operation (MO). Michael’s approach has received widespread attention and 
has been cited in numerous articles in the past 25 years. There is no doubt 
that Michael’s analysis has played an important role in orientating behavior 
analysts toward the important role of motivational factors in influencing 
behavior. Indeed, the Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis has featured 
several empirical and theoretical papers on the topic of EOs/MOs (see McGill, 
1999; Michael, 2000; Smith & Iwata, 1997). This research has shown that 
the manipulation of motivational factors is a powerful method for reducing 
problem behavior and for increasing desired behavior (Iwata, Smith, & 
Michael, 2000). The analysis of motivational variables has, however, received 
comparatively little attention in the basic behavior-analytic literature (but 
see McPherson & Osborne, 1988, for a basic-research example).
The importance of motivational variables calls for a precise and coherent 
conceptual analysis. However, it is important to recognize that any new 
concept in our science should be scrutinized carefully before that concept 
is widely accepted. It is on this basis, perhaps, that the MO concept has not 
gone entirely unchallenged (e.g., Catania, 1993; Cherpas, 1993; McDevitt 
& Fantino, 1993). Our aim in the current article is to briefly consider the 
challenge to the MO and to present an alternative account of motivation. 
Our approach is strongly influenced by the fact that the scientific method is 
biased toward parsimony and that this bias has served behavior analysis well 
in constructing an account of nonhuman and human psychology (Chiesa, 
1994). We believe that a relatively straightforward explanatory framework 
for describing motivated behavior is possible. And we invite others to decide 
for themselves if our treatment provides an adequate and parsimonious 
explanatory framework in which to interpret motivational factors.
Motivating Operations
Borrowing from Keller and Schoenfeld (1950), Michael (1982, 1993a) 
initially proposed the concept of the EO, and Michael and colleagues more 
recently offered the concept of the MO (Laraway et al., 2003). The MO 
incorporates both the EO and the EO’s negative counterpart, the abolishing 
operation (AO). Laraway et al. defined the MO as some environmental 
variable (event, operation, condition, etc.) that, first, alters the consequential 
effectiveness of other events, objects, or stimuli. Laraway et al. described 
this as the value-altering effect, which is a generic description of a change 
in the effectiveness of any operant consequence. Second, Laraway et al. 
suggested that an MO changes the current frequency of all behavior that has 
been reinforced by those events, objects, or stimuli and described this as the 
behavior-altering effect. Laraway et al. recommended that behavior analysts 
“(a) use the verb evoke to describe an increase and the verb abate to describe 
a decrease in responding due to the action of antecedents and (b) denote 
the former an evocative effect and the latter an abative effect” (p. 411). 
EOs for reinforcers have evocative effects, as do AOs for punishers. AOs 
for reinforcers have abative effects, as do EOs for punishers. For example, 
according to the explanatory framework described in Laraway et al., food 
deprivation is an MO that increases the reinforcing effect of food and also 
evokes behaviors that have in the past led to food. Food satiation is an AO 
that decreases the reinforcing effect of food and abates behaviors that have 
in the past led to food. 
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In prev ious publ icat ions, Michael (1993a) introduced the term 
unconditioned establishing operations (UEOs). In this case, the reinforcer-
establishing effect is unlearned and a consequence of the evolution of the 
species. More specifically, UEOs are described as environmental events, 
operations, or stimulus conditions that regulate the momentary effectiveness 
of unconditioned reinforcers (and also the momentary effectiveness of the 
conditioned reinforcers based on those unconditioned reinforcers). Examples 
of UEO’s include food, water, activity, sleep, temperature changes, sexual 
reinforcers, and painful stimulation in the contexts of escape and aggression. 
The concept of establishing stimuli (SEs), first mentioned in Michael (1982), 
was renamed in Michael (1993a) as conditioned establishing operations (CEOs). 
As with SEs, CEOs were hypothesized as variables that alter the reinforcing 
effectiveness of other events as a result of an individual organism’s history. 
Three types of CEOs were described: a surrogate CEO, which involves 
correlating a stimulus with a UEO; a reflexive CEO, which involves correlating 
a stimulus with worsening or improvement; and a transitive CEO, which 
is described as conditional conditioned reinforcement and punishment 
(see Michael, 1993a, pp. 198–205, for a comprehensive treatment of these 
concepts). We discuss these subdivisions in detail at a later stage. 
Problems with Motivating Operations 
Although behavior analysts have recognized that dealing with the issue 
of motivation is important, and Michael and his colleagues have clearly 
attempted to do this, some have questioned the treatment they have offered 
of this important topic (e.g., Catania, 1993; McDevitt & Fantino, 1993). The 
main criticisms are based on the introduction of several new terms and 
concepts that do not always overlap with established verbal practice, concern 
over the dual nature of the MO, and a lack of adequate contact with empirical 
data. We briefly review these three criticisms before suggesting a possible 
alternative.
Terminological Ambiguities
At the present time, the following key terms have been offered by 
Michael and his colleagues in their treatment of motivation: motivating 
operation (MO) and its two subtypes, establishing operation (EO) and 
abolishing operation (AO). The establishing operation has two subtypes, the 
unconditioned establishing operation (UEO) and the conditioned establishing 
operation (CEO). The latter has itself three subtypes, the surrogate CEO, the 
reflexive CEO, and the transitive CEO. A number of other terms are also used 
to describe the effects of the operations outlined above, for example, the 
evocative and the abative effects (e.g., Laraway et al., 2003). Moreover, other 
terms have also been introduced that are not directly related to motivation—
unconditioned elicitor (UE), conditioned elicitor (CE), and unconditioned 
conditioner (UC; Michael, 1983)—but nonetheless appear to be important for 
Michael’s conceptual analysis. The proliferation of so many new terms has 
been criticized by others in the field, such as Catania (1993), who commented 
that “Michael’s article introduces many terms and abbreviations without 
justification. . . . I believe that introducing so many new ones wholesale can 
only lead to terminological confusion” (p. 219). 
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Some confusion may also arise from the use of terms in ways that 
depart from traditional behavior-analytic verbal practices. In constructing 
functional analytic treatments of behavior, it has proved useful to 
distinguish between behavioral operations and behavioral processes. 
Operations refer to the reinforcement contingencies and other relations 
between organism and environment that the researcher or practitioner 
arranges. Processes refer to the behavioral changes that occur as a result of 
the operations. So, for example, a researcher might establish reinforcement 
as an operation by arranging a contingency between a rat’s lever pressing 
and the delivery of food, and then subsequently observe reinforcement 
as a process if the animal’s lever pressing increases as a function of the 
operation. Consistent with this distinction between behavioral operation 
and process, Catania (1993) argued that the term establishing operation is 
inherently misleading. As he pointed out, operations are typically defined 
as manipulations of the environment, and thus, the modifiers unconditioned 
and conditioned are not appropriate for the term establishing operation. Only 
the reinforcing properties of particular stimuli can be learned or unlearned 
(i.e., a behavioral process); the manipulations of the operations themselves 
are not learned behaviors. In addition, Catania pointed out that the terms 
unconditioned and conditioned, in the context of UEO and CEO, are overly 
restrictive, because “conditioned” does not encompass all learned behaviors. 
For example, the imprinting of a duckling on a specific stimulus (typically 
a parent) is not a UEO, but neither is it a consequence of conditioning. 
Catania suggested that the terms learned and unlearned may substitute more 
satisfactorily. 
The Dual Nature of the MO
Michael’s definition of the MO involves a dual-process concept, in that 
a distinction is made between value-altering and behavior-altering effects. 
According to Michael, Hixson, and Clark (1997), this distinction is made for 
the following reason:
We can’t have our organism engaging in behavior that has 
made it warmer when it is actually food deprived, and vice 
versa. And because real organisms show these differential 
forms of behavior prior [emphasis added] to actually achieving 
the relevant reinforcement—during extinction responding, 
for example—the differential moment-by-moment behavioral 
frequency cannot depend upon the organism making contact 
with the reinforcer. (pp. 240–241) 
Michael (2000) expanded further on the nature of the EO/evocative 
relation and again cautioned against conceptualizing the evocative effect 
of the EO as a product of the organism’s contact with the more effective 
reinforcement. According to Michael,
food depr ivat ion makes food a more effect ive form of 
reinforcement and increases the current frequency of all 
behavior that has been reinforced with food. These two effects 
occur simultaneously and independently. . . . The relation 
between rate of responding on a variable-interval food schedule 
and food-deprivation level might be thought of as a model for 
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the evocative effect, but it is not an appropriate model because 
on such a schedule the increased rate is a function of both 
EO effects. The organism’s rate of food-reinforced behavior 
increases prior [emphasis added] to obtaining any food as the 
evocative effect of the EO, and may increase further after a 
response is followed by the more effective food reinforcement. 
A more appropriate conceptual model for the evocative effect 
by itself is the direct relation between deprivation level and 
the initial rate of responding or the total number of responses 
emitted during extinction. (p. 403) 
In effect, Michael makes a clear distinction between increases in 
behavior that are (a) due to deprivation per se and (b) due to a combination 
of deprivation and a history of reinforcement with respect to that 
behavior.
Michael’s separation of motivational effects has been criticized 
by, among others, McDevitt and Fantino (1993), who stated that “the 
evocative function of an EO seems to bring us no closer to predicting 
the nature of the response, which is usually dependant upon additional 
contextual stimuli” (p. 226). Similarly, Klatt and Morris (2001) noted that 
there may be methodological problems with separating out the value-
altering and behavior-altering effects of MOs because “even though 
the evocative effect of response deprivation seems to be necessary for 
the first occurrence of instrumental responding, the effect is often 
unmeasured” (p. 177). 
On balance, perhaps Michael and colleagues are suggesting that the 
evocative effect occurs at the start of an experimental session before any 
reinforcer has been delivered within that session. However, this approach 
seems to ignore the fact that reentering the experimental context at the start 
of a session will likely possess discriminative properties for the availability 
of reinforcement, based on previous sessions. In summary, therefore, the 
evocative function of the EO remains unclear (cf. the value-altering effect) 
and certainly at the present time seems to remain largely a theoretical rather 
than an empirical construct. 
Lack of Empirical Supporting Evidence
Perhaps the most serious problem with the concept of MOs is that 
some aspects of the MO theoretical framework are not strongly rooted 
in a current and growing body of empirical data. To his credit, Michael 
(2000) himself admitted that his statements “often go beyond well-
established empirical support” (p. 402). In addition, previous writings on 
the MO concept have not incorporated research findings that are typically 
grouped under the headings of, for example, behavioral economics (Perry 
& Fisher, 2001), reinforcement hierarchies (DeLeon et al., 2001), response 
deprivation (Catania, 1993; Dougher, 1983; Hanley, Iwata, Lindberg, 
& Conners, 2003; Klatt & Morris, 2001; McDevitt & Fantino, 1993), the 
Premack principle (Hanley, Iwata, Roscoe, Thompson, & Lindberg, 2003), 
and other variables relevant to UEOs (Catania, 1993). It might be argued, 
therefore, that the MO approach to motivation is too narrow, and thus it 
has mitigated against the wider application of motivational variables to a 
wider range of behaviors. 
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An Alternative Conceptual Analysis of Motivation
Given the foregoing criticisms of Michael’s treatment of motivation, we 
have sought to develop an alternative treatment of motivation that derives 
from Skinner’s early work, utilizes only two new terms, does not incorporate 
the concept of a dual process, and also makes contact with a broader range 
of existing data.
There has been a tendency within behavior analysis to view most 
behavior as under the complete control of a discriminative stimulus (SD). 
However, Skinner (1938) issued a cautionary note concerning the use of the 
technical term SD:
[The discriminative stimulus] is perhaps best described as 
“setting the occasion” for a response. Whether or not the 
response is to occur does not depend upon the discriminative 
stimulus, once it is present, but upon other factors. . . . Strictly 
speaking we should refer to a discriminated operant as 
“occurring in the presence of” rather than “elicited as a response 
to” SD. (p. 241)
We will argue that it is these “other factors” that should be regarded 
as motivational variables. That is, factors that inf luence the rate of 
operant responding (i.e., factors that act on two-, three-, four-, or five-term 
contingencies and so on) but are not part of the discriminated operant 
contingency are considered motivational. 
Consequence-Valuing Operations (CVOs) and Consequence-Valuing 
Processes (CVPs) 
One methodology for analyzing motivation, based on Skinner’s treatment 
of motivation (Skinner, 1938, 1953), would involve establishing an operant 
contingency and then determining if the frequency of responding could be 
manipulated without changing that contingency or the discriminative control 
over that contingency. Indeed, in a classic study in this area, Skinner fed an 
animal (that was always 24-hr food deprived) with varying amounts of food 
just prior to an experimental session. He subsequently observed that response 
rate during that session decreased as a function of increased supplemental 
feeding, although the contingency and antecedent stimulus conditions 
remained unchanged (see Skinner, 1938, p. 393; Figure 1 displays these data).
In colloquial terms, one might view the presession feeding as altering the 
drive or motivational state inside the animal. In behavior analysis, however, 
such organocentric terms are usually avoided (see Hineline, 1980; see also 
Skinner, 1945), and perhaps for this reason, the term establishing operation was 
first introduced. The EO refers, at least in part, to establishing the reinforcing 
effectiveness of a particular consequence rather than some internal state.
An alternative term that may be used to describe the type of effect 
demonstrated by Skinner in 1938 would refer to the effectiveness, or 
apparent value, of the consequential stimuli that participate in an operant 
contingency. For this reason, we offer the following two concepts: the 
consequence-valuing operation (CVO) and the consequence-valuing process 
(CVP). The former refers to the contextual arrangements made by a 
researcher or practitioner that are designed to either increase or decrease 
the value of a consequence in an operant contingency without changing or 
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Figure 1. Response rates from Skinner’s (1938) study. The numbers above the lines 
represent food in grams.
altering that contingency, or by demonstrating some interaction between the 
factors of consequence value and contingency relations. The CVP refers to 
the behavior changes that occur as a result of the CVO. In Skinner’s study, 
therefore, presession feeding would be defined as a CVO and the changes 
in response rate that occurred across different prefeeding amounts as a 
CVP. Of course, Skinner’s study provides but one example, so we will work 
systematically through what we see as the main permutations involved in 
establishing CVOs and measuring CVPs. In doing so, we will refer to some of 
the available and relevant applied literature in the area. 
Basic operant responding and discriminated operant responding. Table 1 
displays a number of functional relations. Row 1 lists the kinds of events 
necessary to describe basic operant functional relations: a baseline rate of 
consequence value and a particular stimulus situation (SS
1
) in which at least 
some kinds of responses are followed by reinforcement. The rate of operant 
responding can be some arbitrary value above zero, B (indicating baseline). 
Rows 2 and 3 illustrate what happens when a response is reinforced in some 
of the elements of a situation but not reinforced in others. Stimuli that 
are correlated with reinforcement and an increased rate of responding are 
termed SDs, and stimuli that are negatively correlated with reinforcement 
and correlated with a decreased rate of responding are termed S∆s. Thus, 
Rows 2 and 3 represent discriminative control over responding. The 
response rate in the presence of the SD is some value greater than B, say X, 
whereas the response rate in the presence of the S∆ will be some value less 
than B, say Y. Figure 2 presents a simplified version of an actual experiment 
that demonstrated the development of control by a discriminative stimulus 
and thus represents the functional relations described in Rows 1, 2, and 3. 
As an aside, we recognize that what we describe as basic operant responding 
is likely to be under some form of discriminative control, and thus the 
distinction we have made between basic and discriminated operants is based 
on the scientist’s or practitioner’s perspective, rather than the organism’s.
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Figure 2. A simplified version of an actual experiment that demonstrated the 
development of control by a discriminative stimulus.
Increased consequential value. A situation may arise in which a CVO is 
conducted with the aim of changing response rate. The operation can be 
deemed to have increased the value of the consequence (i.e., is motivational) 
if the relations among the events within the n-term discriminated operant 
remain unchanged. We can speak of a CVP if, as a result of an operation, 
response rate in the presence of the SD is increased relative to the baseline 
response rate in the presence of SD (i.e., greater than X ). Similarly, a CVP has 
occurred if the response rate in the presence of the S∆ is increased relative to 
the response rate in the presence of S∆ in the baseline condition (i.e., greater 
than Y ). 
An applied example of Row 4 can be seen in Vollmer and Iwata 
(1991). In this study, CVOs were arranged with respect to food (primary 
reinforcement), social interaction (conditioned reinforcement), and 
music (sensory reinforcement). All participants were diagnosed as being 
profoundly developmentally delayed. In the music condition, for example, a 
participant who had gone 30 min without musical stimulation was presented 
with a switch-closing task. This task was consequated with the production 
of music. All of the response rates were higher in the deprivation than in the 
baseline condition across all tasks, with one exception. Thus, although the 
operant contingency remained unchanged, the results of this study indicated 
that the target responses varied as a function of relative deprivation versus 
satiation.
Klatt and Morris (2001) noted that response deprivation, which subsumes 
the Premack principle, could usefully be described as an establishing 
operation. Hanley, Iwata, Roscoe, et al. (2003) and Hanley, Iwata, Lindberg, 
et al. (2003) demonstrated that response restriction and the application of 
the Premack principle could increase the rate of previously nonpreferred 
activities (i.e., were CVOs).
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An experimenter can also introduce a novel antecedent stimulus into 
a situation, and leave the n-term contingency unchanged, with the aim of 
changing consequential value (i.e., a CVO). A CVP has occurred if this 
consequence-valuing stimulus is correlated with an increase in responding 
either above X if the SD is present or above Y if the S∆ is present (Row 4). 
Similar results can be seen when reinforcer sampling is employed. That is, 
presession exposure to stimuli that share perceptual functions, such as 
edibles, seems to increase the probability of responding in a given context, 
relative to a baseline condition (Allyon & Azrin, 1968).
Decreased consequential value. A similar logic can be applied if some 
operation is correlated with a response rate that is lower than X in the 
presence of the SD and/or is lower than Y in the presence of the S∆. These 
can be termed consequence-devaluing operations, and Row 5 displays these 
relationships. Consequence-devaluing processes can be observed, for example, 
in Vollmer and Iwata (1991). In the satiation condition of Vollmer and 
Iwata, the participant listened to 30 min of music prior to exposure to the 
switch-closing task. The response rate in satiation was always lower than in 
deprivation across all tasks. Parenthetically, Murphy, McSweeney, Smith, and 
McComas (2003) have argued that the decrease in reinforcer effectiveness 
following repeated presentations is due to habituation rather than to 
satiation. In any case, the decrease in response rate, whether due to satiation 
or habituation, is a CVP.
Horner, Day, and Day (1997) introduced what they called a neutralizing 
routine to reduce problem behavior. In the case of one participant, Karl, 
the problem behavior was aggression or self-injury, or both. An SD for this 
problem behavior was defined as physical interruption when Karl was 
reaching for a food item on the reinforcer tray. The authors also established 
that there was an increase in this problem behavior from baseline when 
Karl had fewer than 5 hr of sleep the previous night. In Karl’s case, the 
devaluing operation (i.e., the neutralizing routine) was the opportunity to 
take a nap. The probability of the problem behavior for Karl was .295 when 
the baseline CVO (i.e., fewer than 5 hr of sleep) and the SD were in effect. 
When the consequence-devaluing operation, the neutralizing routine, was 
introduced, the probability of responding when the SD was held constant fell 
to .012. Horner et al. also described a situation in which the probability of 
responding when the baseline CVO was in effect but the SD was not present 
was .167. When the consequence-devaluing operation was arranged, the 
probability of responding in the absence of the SD fell to .05.
In all of the above examples, the concepts of CVO and CVP can be readily 
applied as terms that serve to describe the increase and decrease in the 
relevant behaviors, independent of other contingencies. 
Interactions Between Contingencies and Motivation
Behavioral economics. Researchers who study behavioral economics 
have noted that changing the contingencies in an experiment, such that 
an increase in response rate is needed to produce reinforcement, does not 
always reliably result in an increased response rate. For example, in Hursh 
(1978; Experiment 1) response rates increased with increasing variable-
interval (VI) schedules. In contrast, in Hursh’s Experiment 2, response rates 
decreased with increasing VI schedules under an identical VI contingency. 
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The crucial difference between these experiments was that subjects in 
Experiment 1 were participating in a closed economy, whereas subjects in 
Experiment 2 were participating in an open economy. In closed economies, 
reinforcers are only available within the experimental session; that is, 
deprivation is not artificially held constant by the experimenter. An 
open economy is any of a variety of experimental arrangements in which 
reinforcers are provided outside of the experimental session. The CVO in the 
case of the Hursh experiments was the between-session feedings, and the 
CVP was the divergent response rates across both the altered contingencies 
and altered consequential values. 
Perry and Fisher (2001) examined the effects of manipulating both 
consequential values and contingencies. Their results demonstrated that 
several variables can interact to influence response allocation between 
appropriate and destructive behavior. For example, as response effort 
increased, the higher-quality reinforcer increased in consequential value. 
Increasing the “price” associated with destructive behavior by adding a 
punishment procedure canceled out the effects of increasing the response 
effort and the amount of compliance with requests completed.
Behavioral pharmacology. The administration of drugs can have a 
considerable influence on behavior even if the operant contingencies 
are held constant. As such, drugs are examples of CVOs. A common drug 
administered to individuals with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder 
(ADHD) is methylphenidate (MPH; more commonly known by the brand name 
Ritalin). It has been difficult, however, to accurately measure the effects 
of MPH, because most studies have evaluated treatment effects based on 
participant report, parent report, teacher report, and behavior rating scales, 
which are often inadequate measures (Stoner, Carey, Ikeda, & Shinn, 1994). 
In addition, most studies have relied on between-group design, which may 
be problematic because there are large individual differences in response 
to MPH, and dose–response relations are not necessarily linear. Therefore, 
it is desirable to use single-case designs in order to measure the interaction 
between operant contingencies and CVOs. 
Gulley and Northup (1997) provided a well-controlled example of the 
effects of MPH on problem behavior, and we take the case of one participant 
diagnosed with ADHD, Jacob, as an example. Jacob was administered three 
different dosages—low, medium, and high—and a placebo. Disruptive behavior 
was significantly reduced at the high dosage, but there were no differences at 
the low and medium dosages. Interestingly, this pattern of results was almost 
directly opposite on a reading task: There was no difference between the 
placebo and the highest dosage, but performance was improved at the lowest 
dosage. Furthermore, there was no difference in performance on a math task 
between the placebo and any dosage. The key point to note is that the effects 
of the CVO were specific to the dosage or area of functioning. In other words, 
there were complex interactions between behavior and its consequence and 
the CVO in terms of their effects on the CVP. 
Advantages of Using the CVO and CVP Concepts for the Practitioner
Researchers who manipulate motivational factors have “generally 
adopted Michael’s terminology with respect to [MOs/EOs]” (Laraway et al., 
2003, p. 407). Thus, it is incumbent upon us to outline the advantages and 
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potential disadvantages of using the conceptual analysis that we have 
offered, and these are as follows.
The concept of the CVO/CVP is already the de facto approach. Although we 
have introduced two new terms, we believe that adopting our analysis would 
require minimal adjustment on the part of practitioners. Indeed, perhaps 
the concept of the CVO is the de facto approach adopted by applied behavior 
analysts when they discuss motivational factors. That is, the evocative 
function of the MO does not seem to play a significant role in behavioral 
research on motivation. For example, Smith and Iwata (1997) described their 
criteria for classifying and identifying an antecedent variable as an EO as 
follows:
Antecedent variables are classified as EOs if, given constant 
contingencies between behavior and consequences, behavior 
was altered by the presence or absence of antecedent variables. 
Thus, when antecedent conditions vary independent of the 
probability of reinforcement or punishment, behavioral effects 
are described in terms of EOs. (p. 350)
The approach described by Smith and Iwata for identifying motivational 
variables seems to overlap substantially with our concept of CVOs and CVPs 
(also see Valdivia, Luciano, & Molina, 2006). We have criticized the behavior-
altering component of MOs on theoretical grounds, but, perhaps more 
seriously, the evocative/behavior-altering effect has played virtually no role 
in any applied study to date. It appears, therefore, that practitioners have 
already studied motivation without incorporating the dual nature of the MO. 
Our analysis is more consistent with behavior-analytic theory and practice. 
Some researchers have criticized Skinner’s approach to motivational factors, 
claiming that it is inadequate for describing the historical processes that 
give rise to motivated behavior. For example, Smith and Iwata (1997) claimed 
that 
Skinner’s analysis of antecedent events included a functional 
account of the discriminated operant; however, events such as 
satiation and deprivation, emotions, aversive stimulation, and 
other antecedent variables were described in terms of observed 
stimulus–response relations. Conspicuously absent was an 
account of the relationship between these antecedent conditions 
and the consequences that maintain operant behavior. Whereas 
the discriminative stimulus derives control over responding 
through a special historical relationship with behavioral 
consequences, Skinner’s account of other antecedents suggests 
a different source of influence between some antecedent stimuli 
and behavior. Thus, although no internal contradictions exist 
in a Skinnerian account of antecedent influences, further 
theoretical extension is necessary. (p. 346)
The introduction of the terms CVO and CVP is an attempt to provide 
further theoretical extension of Skinner’s account of motivational factors 
by providing a more precise nomenclature to help clarify the relations 
among antecedent variables. By focusing on the value of the reinforcer in 
terms of the level of responding that occurs relative to some previously 
measured baseline, a CVO approach is clearly consistent with a functional-
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analytic interpretation of behavior–environment interactions. Students and 
practitioners who are familiar with the concept of stimulus control, and the 
technical terms SD and S∆, would likely have little trouble in comprehending 
and applying a CVO analysis.
More phenomena encompassed results in an increase in scope. In this 
article, we have described a number of behavioral phenomena that are 
included in our definition of motivation. In contrast, the MO concept seems 
to focus on very specific types of relations among variables, and hence 
many motivational phenomena are not considered. Furthermore, we have 
not identified any specific relations a priori, but rather have described the 
pattern of environment–behavior interactions that we think constitute 
motivational operations and processes. In this manner, perhaps behavior 
analysts can study motivational variables that traditionally have not been 
encompassed under the rubric of behavioral psychology (see Catania, 
1993, p. 223). For example, the lack of motivation displayed by depressed 
individuals is clearly an important issue, although the explanations for the 
processes involved are often rife with explanatory fictions (see Chiesa, 1994). 
For instance, impaired motivation in depressed patients has been described 
as a “lack of an appropriate response to explicit reward . . . where depressed 
patients may not perceive reward as reinforcing because of a low hedonic 
capacity” (Austin, Mitchell, & Goodwin, 2000, p. 202). Clearly, the clarity that 
a parsimonious functional-analytic approach could bring to topics such as 
this would be useful.
Is There a Loss of Precision?
The specific subdivisions of the CEO have rarely been employed; 
rather, the general term EO has been utilized to refer to alterations in 
motivational factors. This does not necessarily mean that these subdivisions 
are redundant, and perhaps they could offer more precision and more 
explanatory power than the concepts of CVO and CVP. In addressing this 
issue, it is necessary to go into some detail.
Three types of CEOs have been described: a surrogate CEO, which 
involves correlating a stimulus with a UEO; a reflexive CEO, which involves 
correlating a stimulus with worsening or improvement; and a transitive CEO, 
which involves conditional conditioned reinforcement and punishment. In 
each case, we will argue that the terms CVO and CVP can be combined with 
existing behavioral terms to adequately describe the range of phenomena 
described thus far in the applied behavioral literature. 
Surrogate CEOs are established when a neutral event is paired with 
or systematically precedes a UEO or a CEO. In other words, the previously 
neutral event may acquire the motivational characteristics of the event with 
which it is paired. For example, correlating a neutral stimulus with painful 
stimulation may increase the effectiveness of pain reduction as a form of 
reinforcement and evoke the behavior that has been reinforced with pain 
reduction. However, the introduction of the term surrogate would seem to 
be nothing more than a replacement term for the word pairing, and it is 
questionable if this new term adds any explanatory precision. Furthermore, 
there are a number of ways in which a previously neutral stimulus can 
acquire the properties of an unconditioned stimulus, and for which a 
number of existing modifiers can be applied (see Catania, 1993, for a more 
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comprehensive treatment of this issue). For example, a direct contingency 
might be arranged between the unconditioned and neutral stimulus, or 
each might participate in the same equivalence class or relational frame 
(Hayes, Kohlenberg, & Hayes, 1991; Whelan & Barnes-Holmes, 2004; Whelan, 
Barnes-Holmes, & Dymond, 2006). None of these alternate scenarios would 
be covered by the term surrogate CEO, although in each case the previously 
neutral event may acquire the motivational characteristics of the UEO 
or CEO. 
A ref lex ive CEO is assumed to be establ ished when a st imulus 
systematically precedes some form of worsening and this worsening does 
not occur if the stimulus is terminated. For example, a warning stimulus 
in an avoidance procedure can acquire the capacity to establish its own 
termination as a form of conditioned reinforcement and can evoke any 
behavior that has accomplished this termination. However, as McDevitt 
and Fantino (1993) pointed out, an analysis based on compound stimuli 
is also plausible. To take an applied example, if a demand were presented 
(e.g., “Let’s start to work in a minute”) and these demands were often 
escaped from, then they can be conceptualized as a reflexive CEO (McGill, 
1999). Extending the argument made by McDevitt and Fantino (pp. 226–
227), an alternative view is that the escape behavior is reinforced because 
it is correlated with an increase in the time to the task when a demand 
has been presented but is not correlated with an increase in the absence 
of the demand. According to McDevitt and Fantino’s analysis, the demand 
and the task together can be considered as a compound SD for escape 
behavior because they are uniquely correlated with an increase in the 
availability of reinforcement (escape from task) for a particular response 
(escape behavior). In this case, SD and CVO concepts are sufficient to cover 
this eventuality and, on the grounds of parsimony, are preferable over 
the extra concept of the reflexive CEO. Indeed, in our view, there must 
always be some kind of CVO in order for operant responding to occur. 
The CVO in this example is the baseline rate of reinforcer effectiveness 
for escaping the task, although it was not systematically manipulated in 
this case. 
Michael (1993a) acknowledged that both a compound stimulus and a 
CEO approach are possible but disliked the former because the explanation 
“involving the compound stimulus doesn’t seem to isolate the relevant 
controlling variables as well as the CEO version does” (p. 235). Although 
Michael argued that the MO approach serves to isolate the relevant 
controlling variables, it remains the case that both basic and applied 
researchers have not used his concepts to do so. Once again, therefore, it 
is possible that many of the subdivisions within the concept of the MO are 
redundant and the simpler process account provided by CVOs and CVPs, 
combined with established behavior principles, is sufficient. 
Transitive CEOs are established when a certain stimulus condition is 
correlated with the correlation between another stimulus and some form 
of worsening or improvement. Thus, the first stimulus establishes the 
reinforcing or punishing effectiveness of the second stimulus and evokes 
or suppresses the behavior that has been followed by that reinforcement or 
punishment. To illustrate our approach, an example from McGill (1999) is 
presented:
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For example, the instructor’s saying ‘‘No!’’ during the activity 
may momentarily increase the reinforcing effectiveness of 
escape from the activity and evoke problem behavior that 
results in escape. If it can be shown that the problem behavior 
is reinforced by escape from the activity (rather than just from 
the instructor saying ‘‘No!’’), then the correction procedure has 
the properties of a transitive CEO. It is a CEO (rather than an SD) 
because escape from the activity is equally available whether or 
not the instructor says ‘‘No!’’ It is transitive in that it operates 
directly on an independent event (the reinforcing effectiveness 
of escape from the activity). (p. 409)
The argument for employing the term transitive CEO is that this 
stimulus acts on an independent event rather than altering its own function. 
However, almost all antecedent stimuli act on other events rather than 
altering their own function. Indeed, a surrogate CEO can also act in this 
way. If, for example, a neutral stimulus correlated with painful stimulation 
increases the effectiveness of pain reduction as a form of reinforcement 
and evokes the behavior that has been reinforced with pain reduction, then 
this can be considered as both a surrogate and transitive CEO. Applying our 
analysis to the above example, saying the word “no!” would be described as a 
CVO because the availability of reinforcement (escape from the activity) was 
not altered. A CVP would be observed when the problem behavior increased 
following presentation of the word.
In summary, our contention is that the subdivisions of the MO are not 
necessary because existing behavioral terminology is sufficient, at least 
for now, to describe motivated behavior with both scope and precision. 
According to Skinner, “To insist upon the constancy of properties which 
can be shown not to affect the measurements in hand is to make a fetish of 
exactitude. . . . What is wanted is the ‘necessary and sufficient’ correlation of 
a stimulus and a response” (1935/1999, p. 507). In our view therefore, terms 
such as learned, unlearned, conditioned, unconditioned, first-order, second-
order, and so on can all be employed as modifiers for CVOs, in the same way 
that we apply these modifiers to antecedent stimuli that are correlated with 
the differential availability of reinforcement. 
Conclusion
In this article, we criticized the concept of the motivating operation (e.g., 
Laraway et al., 2003) on the grounds that the terms and concepts employed 
do not always overlap with traditional behavior-analytic verbal practices, 
that the dual nature of the MO is unclear, and that there is a lack of adequate 
contact with empirical data. Instead, we offered two key terms, consequence-
valuing operation (CVO) and consequence-valuing process (CVP). In this 
alternative account, the focus is on the value of the reinforcer in terms of 
the level of responding that occurs relative to some previously measured 
baseline, and a distinction between operation and process is incorporated. 
Our account can accommodate the extant data on motivational factors and 
consequently is a more parsimonious approach that is no less precise than 
the MO concept. It is an accepted tenet of the scientific method that if two 
theories are equal in their explanatory power, then the simpler of the two 
is superior. We recognize, however, that adopting these terms would require 
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some adjustment on the part of the behavioral community. Ultimately, our 
hope is that the adoption of the CVO and CVP concepts will better facilitate 
practitioners and researchers in identifying, analyzing, and manipulating 
target behaviors.
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